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Throughout much of 2003, 2004and 2005, the internationalcommunity has watched inmorbid fascination as Iran and
the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) waltzed through a halting, reluctant
slow-dance, with each side alternately
pushing the other away in response to
unwanted entreaties, only to re-embrace in
the halting partnership.  Chaperoning the
encounter is the European Community
acting as a supportive partner, with the
United States and Israel in a more threat-
ening guise.  The song is still playing,
though it remains unclear whether the two
sides will decide to stay until the end of the
dance. Many interested parties await the
outcome: the Israelis, the United States,
and indeed the entire Middle East.
While the international community
remains rightfully transfixed by the pros-
pect of a nuclear-armed Iran, another
concern now shimmers on regional radar
screens.  Periodic press reporting through-
out 2003-05 asserts that Saudi Arabia is
also seriously considering the acquisition of
nuclear weapons as part of a general re-
examination of the assumptions that have
driven the kingdom’s quest for security
over the last 50 years.  The latest reporting
indicates that the Saudis have begun talks
with the IAEA about its “Small Quantities
Protocol.” As it has for other states, the
protocol would allow the Saudis to admit
the possession of allowable quantities of
uranium and plutonium and provide requi-
site assurances that the material was not
stored in a nuclear facility.  Under the
protocol, the material would not be sub-
jected to routine IAEA inspections.1
While the prospect of a nuclear-armed
Saudi Arabia has been dismissed by many
observers and, if realized, would represent
a profoundly unwelcome development for
regional security, the fact that the Saudis
appear interested in a systematic look at
their security strategy is in many ways a
healthy and welcome development. During
the 1990s, the United States unsuccessfully
sought to build a structured dialogue with
the kingdom to address long-term security
strategy and the role that the Saudis might
play in a broader regional framework.  The
Persian Gulf and Middle East have re-
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participation due to reported annoyance
over Bahrain’s free-trade agreement with
the United States.  The GCC, it seems, is
the same as it ever was.
With the region’s largest military
boasting some of the most modern U.S.
defense equipment ever sold to foreign
customers, it seems logical that Saudi
Arabia would seek to insert itself into a
leadership role to work with the region’s
smaller and less-populous states to fashion
a more coherent security framework.
Saud al-Faisal’s words notwithstanding, the
Saudis’ lack of enthusiasm for regional
collective security has only been confirmed
in persistent press reports suggesting that
they are instead considering a route taken
by other regional states – the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and/
or nuclear weapons.  One particularly
interesting report points to Saudi interest in
three options for ensuring security: (1)
seeking the declaration of states in the
region to forsake WMD and create a
WMD-free zone, (2) acquiring nuclear
weapons, and (3) aligning themselves with
an existing nuclear power and placing
themselves under its nuclear umbrella.4
The kingdom’s review of these issues
as evidenced by Saud al-Faisal’s Decem-
ber 2004 speech and the related press
reports over the last 36 months reflects the
House of Saud’s obvious reactions to
fundamental changes in the regional-
security environment.  While the Persian
Gulf and wider Middle East have always
been noted by strategists for their chronic
instability, events over the last several
years have made a bad situation worse.
The Saudis, it seems, have noticed these
changes and are taking stock.
Changes to the region’s security
environment flow from a variety of interre-
mained largely impervious to any efforts
promoting a more integrated regional
security framework.  Indeed, regional
security can be best described simply as
American hegemony.  In addition to
American predominance, there are many
reasons why the regional states have not
organized themselves in an overarching
security construct.  Continued interstate
disputes, lack of a common threat percep-
tion and simple inertia have to be at the top
of any list.  Outside of half-hearted, but
well-intentioned efforts by the sultan of
Oman, none of the region’s states have
tried to lead the region toward military
integration and collective security.2
Perhaps times are changing.  Saudi
foreign minister Saud al-Faisal told an
audience in Bahrain in December 2004 that
a new regional-security framework needed
to be constructed around the following four
pillars: (1) a strong, vibrant Gulf Coopera-
tion Council (GCC) in which the members
are integrated economically, politically and
militarily; (2) the inclusion of Yemen; (3) a
stable and unified Iraq; and (4) the inclu-
sion of Iran.3    Saud al-Faisal noted that
the security of the region should not
depend on the United States, but should
stem from guarantees “…provided by the
collective will of the international commu-
nity through a unanimous declaration by the
Security Council guaranteeing the sover-
eignty, independence and territorial integrity
of all the countries of the Gulf and promis-
ing to act forcefully against any external
threats.”   Whether or not such soaring
rhetoric will be turned into meaningful
action remains to be seen, but the past
actions of the GCC and the Saudis provide
little cause for optimism.  Indeed, the
speech was followed by a GCC summit
notable for the lack of high-level Saudi
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lated forces.  First came the September 11
attacks and the unwelcome (at least from
the Saudi perspective) attention in the
American press to alleged Saudi financial
support for al-Qaeda in conjunction with
stories of Saudi sponsorship of religious
extremism through the funding of madrasas
in Pakistan and elsewhere preaching a
“Wahhabi” fundamentalist version of Islam
to receptive Muslim audiences around the
world.  The situation seemed particularly
acute in Pakistan, where Saudi financial
support for the madrasas and the jihadists
during the war in Afghanistan morphed into
the Taliban, which eventually took over
Afghanistan and provided al-Qaeda with a
geographic base to build an infrastructure
to support terrorist operations around the
world.5   While the press and public justifi-
ably focused on the fact that 15 out of the
19 attackers on 9/11 came from Saudi
Arabia, this alone might not have been so
serious but for the wider context of U.S.-
Saudi relations.  There had been a decade
of drift in the U.S.-Saudi security relation-
ship, highlighted by the obvious discomfort
of the House of Saud with the continuing
presence of U.S. forces operating out of
Prince Sultan Air Base.  With the presence
of these forces seized upon for criticism by
emerging domestic political forces in the
kingdom, the House of Saud found it could
no longer quietly conduct business with the
Americans out of the public view.  More-
over, despite various critics pointing to an
alleged cozy relationship between the Bush
family and the House of Saud, it seemed
unclear after 9/11 whether the Bush
administration was prepared to continue
“business as usual.”  These strains con-
verged to undermine the U.S.-Saudi
relationship; just how seriously remains to
be seen.6
Second came the U.S. invasion of Iraq
in March 2003 and the now-open declara-
tion by President Bush that one of the
principal objectives of using force in Iraq is
somehow to transform the region into more
transparent societies with fundamentally
different political and economic systems.
Such fundamental change is anathema to
the founding principles of the kingdom as
created by Abdul Aziz Ibn Al-Saud in 1932.
Rumors accompanied the Iraq invasion that
the United States also sought to establish a
military partnership with a reconfigured
Iraq that would act as a potential alterna-
tive to the strained relationship with the
House of Saud.  Iraq and its 112 billion
barrels of oil reserves could, some argued,
replace Saudi Arabia as the strategically
vital U.S. partner in the region.  The
United States is reportedly developing a
number of military facilities in Iraq that
could serve as operational hubs similar to
the facilities now in use in Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
Oman.7   On the political front, Bush
administration policy initiatives being
advanced under the rubric of the Middle
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) seek to
help create new governmental political and
economic institutions that will embrace
transparency and accountability. The
Saudis have neither signed up for any of
the MEPI programs nor embraced the
administration’s broader calls to transform
the region. Perhaps unsurprisingly, forcible
regime change in Baghdad has not been
embraced in Riyadh.  Indeed, as will be
discussed later, a new Shiite government in
Baghdad represents a potential threat to
the kingdom.  While important in and of
themselves, the limited municipal elections
in February 2005 do not represent a rush to
fundamentally alter the political status quo
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in the kingdom in ways that meet the
overarching U.S. goal of advancing
freedom and democracy in the region.
Third have come the unfolding revela-
tions by the IAEA that had been long
suspected by many – that Iran is engaged
in a comprehensive and systematic pro-
gram to develop fissile material outside of
international oversight.  There appears little
doubt in some quarters that Iran intends to
develop its own nuclear weapons, going the
route of other regional states – Pakistan,
Israel and India.  This program, in conjunc-
tion with the development of long-range
missile capabilities, potentially provides
Tehran with the means to put a variety of
regional capitals at risk, opening the door to
a coercive political and military framework
designed to support Tehran’s regional
objectives.  The prospect of a nuclear-
armed Iran with long-range missiles
promises to establish a new strategic factor
of analysis for states throughout the region.
Last, but not least, is an emerging and
complicated domestic political landscape
within the kingdom that is forcing the ruling
family to play to its varied “publics” at the
same time it is waging an increasingly
active war against an entrenched militant
infrastructure.  The impact of internal
politics and the battle against al-Qaeda are
both difficult gauges in the context of the
House of Saud’s decision-making process
on how to ensure its long-term security.
Western observers are often quick to
dismiss Saudi domestic “politics” per se,
but the House of Saud governs by consen-
sus and has done so successfully since the
inception of the kingdom.  Maintaining
consensus – a process that is largely
opaque to all but the best-informed observ-
ers – has become increasingly complicated
for the Saudi leadership over the last
decade.  The impact of these domestic
complications on security issues is difficult
to discern.  It can and should, however, be
subjected to some informed speculation by
governments that are interested in trying to
forestall the Saudis from acquiring new and
threatening military capabilities, whether
long-range missiles or nuclear weapons.
In short, strategic, regional and domes-
tic factors are all combining and overlap-
ping to create a profound security dilemma
both for the regime and the nation.  Seen
within this framework, it is not surprising
that the Saudis would be giving serious
thought to the most appropriate way to
ensure their security.
SMOKE AND FIRE?
Growing Saudi concern over its
security dilemma can be detected in the
smoke wafting around this issue.  It started
appearing in the fall of 2003, with further
hints throughout the winter and spring of
2004.  Following the September 18, 2003,
story in The Guardian on the options under
consideration to ensure Saudi security, the
London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq al-
Awsat published an editorial on October 8
titled “Yes, We Fear Iran’s Uranium.”  The
editorial, penned by editor Abd Al-Rahman
Al-Rashad, dismissed the idea that the
Iranian nuclear program was directed at
threats from the United States and Israel:
“The Iranians are enriching uranium to
produce nuclear weapons aimed, essen-
tially, at its neighbors, mainly Pakistan.
However, the danger encompasses the
other neighboring countries as well, such as
Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan….”8   The
editorial further opined,
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We fear Iran’s intentions in producing
nuclear weapons because we under-
stand very well, given the history of
conflicts in the region, that Iran will
push us toward one of the two
tragedies: The simpler tragedy is that
Iran will ignite the spark of the nuclear
arms race in our poverty-stricken
region, whose governments will begin
to purchase these ecologically
dangerous toys at an unbelievably
high price. The second tragedy is that
the arms race will result in putting
these insane weapons to use.9
Following the Al-Sharq al-Awsat













President Pervez Musharraf agreed to
exchange Saudi oil for Pakistani nuclear
“know-how and expertise.”11  The leaders
also reportedly discussed the possibility of
Pakistani troops deploying to the kingdom,
presumably to provide added assurance
against external threats.  Other reports
went further, suggesting that agreement
was reached during these meetings to
station Pakistani nuclear weapons on Saudi
soil.12    During meetings in Islamabad on
October 4, 2004, Pakistani and Saudi
delegations were rumored to have discussed
“ways to undertake a joint venture in the
production of arms and ammunition, ar-
mored fighting vehicles, missiles and
tanks.”13   All recent activity seems consis-
tent with previous Saudi support for and
interest in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile
programs, consisting of alleged Saudi royal-
family representation at a Pakistani ballistic-
missile test in May 2002 and a visit by Saudi
Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince
Sultan in May 1999 to the Pakistani ura-
nium-enrichment facility at Kahuta.14
Some allege that Saudi Arabia provided
Pakistan with critical funding and other
support to help Pakistan absorb the substan-
tial costs of building a nuclear capability.15




as a rumored Sino-
Saudi connection,
stemming in part
from the $3 billion
to $3.5 billion Saudi
acquisition of 40 to
50 Chinese CSS-2
missiles in the late
1980s.  Given
China’s past
history of involvement with the Pakistani
missile and nuclear programs, it is argued
that a Sino-Saudi-Pakistani connection
becomes even more plausible.16   A further
twist on this line of reasoning has been
offered, noting that Saudi Arabia is now
China’s primary source of imported oil, a
relationship that will only become more
pronounced over the next 20 years, assum-
ing the Energy Information
Administration’s projections provide an
analytically sound baseline.17   The presi-
dent and chief executive of Saudi Aramco,
Abdallah Jumah, in fact, recently indicated
that the world’s largest oil company will
Some analysts go further,
suggesting that China aspires
to replace the United States as
the guarantor of Gulf security
and wants to craft a strategic
partnership with the Saudis as
part of such a plan.
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work hard in the years ahead to increase
exports to China.18   The EIA projects that
China may be importing up to 10 million
barrels of oil per day by 2020, with most of
this coming from Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf producers, a significant increase from
today’s levels of approximately 500,000
barrels per day from Aramco.19   These
factors, in a dangerous neighborhood, might
combine to make a more robust military
Sino-Saudi security relationship attractive
to the Al Saud leadership in the years
ahead.20   Some analysts go further,
suggesting that China aspires to replace the
United States as the guarantor of Gulf
security and wants to craft a strategic
partnership with the Saudis as part of such
a plan.21
What is to be made of this reporting,
and which of these issues constitute actual
fires rather than mere smoke?  The flurry
of reporting and follow-on analysis pro-
vides national-security academics and
professionals with a useful means to
analyze the kingdom’s security predica-
ment in the new century.  The task is
admittedly difficult.  There is no open
debate within the kingdom about security
strategy, and senior princes rarely talk
about these issues in public except to
repeat shopworn statements of policy.
Discerning and deducing Saudi signals and
intentions is at best a haphazard process.
It must be attempted, nonetheless, if the
United States and the international commu-
nity are to address what may be the next,
and arguably most crucial, proliferation
challenge in the region.  As part of this
process, the kingdom’s search for security
needs to be framed in a broader context
that can guide analysts and policy makers
to understand the interrelationships among
various Saudi motivations and interests.
Constructing such an analytical framework
can then inform strategy and policy aimed
at addressing the potential issue of Saudi
proliferation.
The public Saudi position on prolifera-
tion and nuclear weapons is clear.  High-
ranking officials in the kingdom repeatedly
renounce interest in acquiring nuclear
weapons, pointing to Saudi Arabia’s
accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) in October 1988 and its
consistent position calling for the creation
of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
(Saudi Arabia also ratified the Chemical
Warfare Convention in 1996.)  A press
release posted on the website of Saudi
Arabia’s Washington Embassy summarily
states: “Reports that Saudi Arabia is
considering acquiring nuclear weapons are
baseless and totally false.  Saudi Arabia
has long advocated for a Middle East that
is free of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons, and there is no basis to change
current policies.”22     Deciding to acquire
nuclear weapons would clearly place Saudi
Arabia outside its NPT commitments.
Recent Saudi statements confirm these
positions.  Saud al-Faisal flatly denied that
the kingdom would develop nuclear weap-
ons in response to Iran’s acquiring them,
stating, “No, we will not [build our own
nuclear weapons].  We do not believe that
it gives any country security to build
nuclear weapons.”23   These statements
have not ended the speculation and seem
at odds with indications that the Saudis
have expressed interest in the IAEA small-
quantities protocol, which would free the
Saudis from reporting up to 10 tons of
natural uranium, 20 tons of depleted
uranium (depending on enrichment levels)
and 2.2 pounds of plutonium.
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LOOMING CSS-2 REPLACEMENT
DECISION
The Saudis face a near-term “wedge”
decision on the proliferation issue:  whether
to replace or upgrade CSS-2/DF-2 missiles
bought from the Chinese in the late 1980s
in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War.  The
Saudis purchased 50-60 missiles with
conventional warheads and a dozen-odd
transporter erector launchers, which are
deployed at two sites with four to six
launch pads per site.  This protracted
strategic bombardment of both Tehran and
Baghdad, while of limited military utility,
had a profound psychological impact on the
leadership of both states.  The missile
purchase followed a decision by the United
States not to sell the kingdom surface-to-
surface missiles. In going to the Chinese,
the Saudis demonstrated interest in diversi-
fying their arms-sales relationships.  This
was also indicated by their purchase of
advanced Tornado aircraft from the British
after repeated difficulties in acquiring F-
15s from the United States in the 1980s.
But, while the Tornado purchase made
sense in terms of Saudi security require-
ments, given the pre-eminent role of the
Royal Saudi Air Force in defending the
kingdom, the link between the CSS-2 and
legitimate military requirements always
seemed more tenuous. With a 2,650-
kilometer range and a reported circular
error probability of nearly a kilometer, it
was always difficult to identify the military
utility of such a conventionally armed
missile.  This led various commentators to
suggest that the missiles boasted a nuclear
payload.
Whatever the reason for the original
purchase, the Saudis must now decide
whether to replace this aging system.  The
Chinese are fielding a second-generation,
solid-propellant missile (DF-21A), which
means that training and support for the
liquid-fueled CSS-2 will become increas-
ingly more complicated and expensive.24
The Saudis face a decision on whether to
allow the CSS-2 to lapse into obsolescence
or replace it with a next-generation system.
The Saudis have a number of options: (1)
phase out the CSS-2 from the force
structure and abandon the long-range
missile program, (2) upgrade to a new
missile and conventional warhead, (3)
upgrade to a new missile with a nuclear
warhead, and (4) opt for a new missile
with an unconventional warhead.
Choosing among these options forces
the Saudis to confront the kingdom’s
increasingly complicated security dilemma,




Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the
United States has remained at the heart of
the kingdom’s quest for security since its
founder, Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, met with
President Roosevelt in the Great Bitter
Lake in February 1945. That meeting
placed a political face on the growing
commercial relationship (dating to Standard
Oil of California’s concession in 1932) and
Saudi Arabia’s gradual emergence as the
dominant player in the world’s oil markets.
As it evolved over the twentieth
century, the U.S.-Saudi partnership formed
around a number of critical political,
economic and military pillars:
• U.S. companies – the Aramco partners –
would exploit Saudi oil reserves and
build out the Saudi energy infrastructure;
• At the political level, the United States
would regard the security of the king-
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dom as a “vital” interest – a commit-
ment conveyed to the House of Saud on
a number of occasions in the post-World
War II era – and would use force and/or
deploy forces to the kingdom if neces-
sary on those occasions when the
House of Saud and the U.S. political
leadership agreed that the situation
warranted;
• The United States would seek to develop
Saudi internal and external security



















markets to ensure that crude reached
the market in a relatively predictable
stream;
• The Saudis would generally support U.S.
interests in the region, such as the
Middle East peace process, though it
would not take the lead publicly in
supporting these interests;
• The United States would not push
substantial internal political or economic
reform, leaving the House of Saud to
fulfill its part of the tacit bargain.
While Saudi Arabia remains a con-
structive and moderating influence in
OPEC, other central elements of the
partnership now appear in question.  While
one hears various high-level Bush adminis-
tration officials make the usual supportive
diplomatic statements about the U.S.-Saudi
relationship, there is little doubt that various
parts of the Bush administration’s national-
security bureaucracy – mostly located in
the Defense Department – are now openly
questioning the value of the Saudi partner-



















achieving U.S. regional objectives.25   Saudi
Arabia now also has few friends in Con-
gress.  Protection of Saudi territorial
integrity and the maintenance of the House
of Saud are no longer routinely described
as “vital” U.S. interests.  To be sure, the
U.S.-Saudi partnership has always been a
marriage of partners that could not be
more culturally and historically dissimilar.
But both parties made a conscious decision
to ignore and work around their
incongruencies to build a security partner-
ship that has proven remarkably durable.26
The partnership has drifted
into decline as the United
States during the 1990s
increasingly focused on solving
the Arab-Israeli dispute and
containing Iraq and Iran,
subjecting the House of Saud
to growing domestic political
pressures stemming from the
prolonged presence of U.S
forces in the kingdom.
72
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XII, NO. 3, FALL 2005
The partnership arguably reached its apex
in the 1980s, when, backed by the CIA and
the White House, the two countries
embarked on covertly opposing the Soviets
in Afghanistan and various other adven-
tures around the globe to combat an
illusory communist menace.  Since then,
however, the partnership has drifted into
decline as the United States during the
1990s increasingly focused on solving the
Arab-Israeli dispute and containing Iraq
and Iran, subjecting the House of Saud to
growing domestic political pressures
stemming from the prolonged presence of
U.S forces in the kingdom.
The September 11 attacks unleashed a
torrent of unflattering stories about the
kingdom’s alleged support for terrorists
around the globe, stemming partly from the
fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers came from
Saudi Arabia, but also due to the apparently
unregulated financial support for charities
suspected of links to al-Qaeda.  The
formulation of these stories identifies the
Saudis as the source of the Wahhabi
“extremist” religious ideology, which has
been aggressively exported throughout the
world with active Saudi political and
financial support.  Thus, the formulations
go, the Saudis are now regarded as an
enemy in the global war on terror.27
Constant battering in the press has taken
its toll on those within the kingdom’s
leadership who would continue to support a
strong U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership.
The Bush administration’s repeated
and forceful enunciations of a strategy to
transform the Middle East into a series of
democratic states have placed additional
pressures on the degraded Saudi-United
States partnership.28   Indeed, one of the
implicit understandings throughout the post-
World War II era was that the United
States would not overtly push the House of
Saud to institute political and economic
reforms.  Clearly, this understanding is no
longer operative.  The Bush administration
appears determined to actively push all
countries in the region towards fundamen-
tal political and economic reforms.  This
places the monarchy on a long-term
collision course with the United States.
A DETERIORATING REGIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
At the same time that the U.S.-Saudi
relationship has been drawn into question,
regional developments have taken a
dramatic turn for the worse – at least from
the Saudi perspective.  While the death of
Yasser Arafat and the emergence of the
democratically elected Palestinian leader
Mahmoud Abbas is a welcome develop-
ment, the last four years have seen the
emergence of militant hardliners on both
the Israeli and Palestinian sides who
appear uninterested in reconciliation and
accommodation.  The sway of these
groups, in combination with the de facto
U.S. abandonment of its policy of acting as
an “honest broker” in the peace process,
has created a seemingly permanent
landscape of conflict that feeds a
radicalizing (and anti-U.S.) mass psychol-
ogy that regimes throughout the region
must deal with as a factor in their internal
and foreign policies.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq represents
another threatening feature on this already
troubled regional landscape.  However
much the Saudis may have disliked
Saddam, the prospect of a Shia-led pseudo
democratic confederation in Iraq (a best-
case scenario) can hardly be any more
palatable in Riyadh.  The Saudis would
face the prospect of a potentially powerful
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neighbor representing a profound political
and religious threat to the kingdom.  A
politically successful Iraq administered by
its Shia majority would place the Saudi
monarchy in a difficult position politically,
since it is already under pressure to speed
up the kingdom’s political reforms.  The
emergence of a Shia-dominated Iraq also
would exacerbate the Saudi regime’s
strained relations with the Shia throughout
the region, but particularly in the kingdom’s
Eastern Province.
Other scenarios in Iraq are hardly
much better for the Saudis.  The potential
splintering of the country into fiefdoms
defined along ethnic, tribal and sectarian
lines creates the prospect of one massive
headache along Riyadh’s unpoliceable
northern frontier.  An Iraq consumed with
ethnic, tribal and sectarian warfare provid-
ing a base of operations for money, men
and materiel that can be funneled into al-
Qaeda’s infrastructure in the kingdom is
another potential negative outcome of
regime change in Baghdad.  In sum, it’s
difficult to see an outcome in Iraq that will
ease Saudi Arabia’s threat perception and
enhance its sense of security.
But if the day-to-day violent spiral in
Iraq is cause for concern in Riyadh, Iran’s
apparently inexorable march towards
developing its own nuclear capability
represents an even more serious challenge.
Tehran’s intentions seem clear to most
observers.  It has built a redundant and
hardened nuclear infrastructure that is all
but impervious to an Osirak-type attack,
and its hard-line religious leadership has
repeatedly stated it will neither abandon its
nuclear program nor place it under mean-
ingful international oversight.  In the
context of Iran’s mature and apparently
successful long-range missile program, the
Islamic Republic appears positioned to
eventually become the world’s next nuclear
power with the ability to deliver a nuclear
weapon to a range of at least 1,250 miles.
Iran’s August 2004 test of an enhanced
Shehab-3 medium-range missile capable of
carrying a 2,250 pound warhead only
confirmed Tehran’s ability to reach targets
throughout the region, including Riyadh.29
Iranian officials have repeatedly claimed
that its nuclear program is intended to
supply fuel for reactors that can generate
up to 7,000 megawatts of electricity by
2020, when Iran’s oil reserves will start to
decline.  It is unlikely that the House of
Saud finds any solace in the hollow-
sounding claims by Iran’s leadership that it




The May 12, 2003, attacks in Riyadh
on Western housing compounds and the
ensuing violence over the next two years
leave no doubt that the House of Saud has
finally awakened to the serious threat
posed by al-Qaeda.  The extent of its
network throughout the kingdom serves as
a cruel reminder that al-Qaeda continues to
pursue a primary mission, as articulated by
Osama bin Laden: to destabilize the
kingdom and remove the apostate House
of Saud from power.  The emergence of
an activist militant infrastructure is a
complicating factor for the regime as it
contemplates growing uncertainties in the
domestic political environment that will
invariably affect any security strategy to
mitigate external threats.
The complexities of the Saudi domestic
political environment and the challenges
facing Crown Prince Abdullah and the
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royal family cannot be overstated.  They
must mobilize the fight against al-Qaeda
while simultaneously preserving consensus
within the royal family and negotiating
reform among the important players on the
domestic scene.
Crown Prince Abdullah has cautiously
initiated a domestic political process that
seeks to address the many difficult issues
facing the kingdom: the role of women,
lack of economic diversification, the place
of the religious establishment in gover-
nance and reform, and the kingdom’s role
within the region and with outside powers
– to name a few.  Internal discussion of the
nation’s external security is absent from
the “National Dialogue” forums held over
the last two years.  However, some of the
“petitions” presented to Abdullah by so-
called reformers have linked the need for
internal reform with the changing external
environment.  In February 2003, petitioners
presented Abdullah with a “National
Reform Document” that complimented the
crown prince for stimulating an internal
debate: “It is a commendable course that
generated support among a score of your
brothers and sons among the citizens, who
are worried about the dangers facing their
country since September 11, 2001.  For
instance, [the region is] threatened with
military action, intervention in internal
affairs and redrawing the whole regional
map.”  The petitioners further stated their
solidarity with the ruling family “…in facing
all dangers which threaten our country’s
present and future.  And they see that
those dangers require serious reforms to
strengthen relations between the leadership
and the community.” Another related group
of pro-reform petitioners reiterated their
concern about the growing terrorist threat
to the kingdom and, in a September 24,
2003 letter to Abdullah, called for a rejec-
tion of “…all kinds of extremism and
violence and terrorism”  in the kingdom.30
It is clear in these and other passages in
the petitions that certain parts of the Saudi
domestic political diaspora recognize the
link between security (both internal and
external) and governmental reform and
want the issue openly discussed.
The process of domestic political
reform will, if nothing else, place security
issues in a broader domestic political
bargaining framework as the House of
Saud navigates between competing con-
stituencies.  There are rumors of internal
schisms within the royal family itself on the
pace and direction of internal reforms.
And, while the regime may seek to limit
treatment of an issue that has always been
limited to dialogue among senior family
members, it seems clear that the outcome
of the kingdom’s internal debate could have
a profound impact on its approach to
security strategy.
While the removal of U.S. operational
forces from Prince Sultan Air Base
eliminated a domestic political irritant for
the regime, broader treatment of the status
of the U.S. relationship must logically
appear at the top of any list of issues to
discuss.  While Saudi Arabia has relied on
U.S. protection for most of the twentieth
century, due to a conscious commitment by
the royal family, it is unclear that there is
still consensus on this issue.  Moreover, it is
almost certainly the case that powerful
domestic constituencies do not want to
continue the U.S.-Saudi relationship on the
same basis. Public opinion forms a support-
ing backdrop on this issue, in which a
variety of opinion polls show overwhelming
disapproval of U.S. policies and of the
United States more generally.  Both the
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religious establishment and dissident clerics
seem united in this opinion.  Consistent
with doctrine of tawhid, these actors are
said to endorse the view that the United
States must be ejected from the region as
an infidel regime engaged in a war on
Islam.  There is much common ground
here between al-Qaeda and certain
elements of the religious establishment.
There are also rumored splits in the family
on this issue, pitting Interior Minister Prince
Nayef and others against Crown Prince
Abdullah.31
Recent pronouncements by some
dissident clerics calling for the ejection of
the United States from the region bring an
added layer of complexity to the domestic
political landscape.32   In November 2004,
these clerics released a fatwa urging
support for the jihadist forces in Iraq
battling the U.S. occupation, asserting that
“…resistance is a legitimate right.  In fact it
is a religious duty…”33   Several prominent
Sunni scholars signed the fatwa – Awad Al
Qarni, Salman Al Awdah and Safar Al
Hawali.  This fatwa followed a May 2004
pronouncement by Saudi dissident cleric,
Nasser bin Hamed Al Fahad, that provided
al-Qaeda with a legal justification for using
weapons of mass destruction, stating, “If
the nonbelievers are not going to be pushed
away from Muslims unless weapons like
WMD are used, then it is legal to use such
weapons to kill them all and destroy their
crops and offspring.”34
These clerics represent new and
powerful actors in the kingdom’s domestic
politics.  It’s becoming increasingly difficult
for the regime to simply throw these
dissidents in jail, the regime’s preferred
course of action over the last decade.  Two
of the main clerics, Safar Al Hawali and
Salman Al Awdah, have carved out a role
for themselves at the national level. The
clerics are said to  represent certain strands
of thought that resonate within the state-
sponsored religious establishment and
broader conservative elements in Saudi
society.35   While they differ in terms of
their support for the regime, they are more
united in their xenophobic message, which is
both strongly anti-Shia and anti-Western. If
the clerics are not united on the outlines of
domestic political reform, they are united in
opposition to both the prospect of a Shia-
dominated government in Baghdad and the
U.S. presence in the region, which is aiding
and abetting the ascent of the Shia on their
doorstep.  The House of Saud eventually
must address the contradictions between its
partnership with the United States and the
arguments for ending the relationship being
advanced by a powerful domestic political
constituency that has been a central pillar of
the regime’s governing structure.   The
confluence of positions between the dissi-
dent clerics and the religious establishment
restricts the House of Saud’s bargaining
power on domestic and international issues,
since the regime’s legitimacy stems from its
historic pledge to uphold the conservative
tenets of Wahhabi Islam in coordination
with the religious establishment.
The shrinking domestic political
maneuvering room may help explain the
caution in placing new military orders with
the United States.  There have been no
major arms sales since the 1997 purchase
of the F-15I fighter aircraft.  The eroded
U.S.-Saudi political partnership cannot but
lead to the re-emergence of the doubts
frequently voiced by the Saudi leadership
during the early 1980s about the reliability
of the United States as a supplier of
advanced weaponry.  The issue of U.S.
reliability becomes critical given the
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dependence of the Saudi Arabian Armed
Forces (SAAF) on the continuous flow of
spare parts and logistical support from the
United States and the accompanying
phalanx of U.S. contractors.  Any disrup-
tion will quickly lead to a deterioration of
the kingdom’s ability to defend itself with
conventional military force. The regime’s
dependence on the U.S.-supported and
supplied Saudi Arabia National Guard
(SANG) constitutes another difficult issue.
SANG’s primary mission of protecting both
the regime and the oil fields may be even
more important than the combat capabili-
ties of the SAAF.  Altering the U.S.
security partnership in a way that leads to
deterioration in the conventional military
capabilities provided by the Ministry of
Defense and Aviation and Office of the
Program Manager for the Saudi Arabia
National Guard organizations only in-
creases Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to
external and internal threats, making
asymmetric security capabilities that much
more cost effective.
House of Saud decision-making on
issues related to external defense and
national security traditionally has been
exercised by a relatively few actors in the
ruling family. It remains unclear how the
senior leadership will address these new
domestic political pressures and the
plethora of emerging actors from across
the political spectrum.  But all these factors
militate against a business-as-usual ap-
proach and suggest a new and more
complicated set of factors that will shape
the kingdom’s security strategy in the years
ahead.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The opposition of the United States to
nuclear and other WMD proliferation is
unequivocal, and a decision to proliferate
by Saudi Arabia obviously would have
disastrous consequences for the U.S.-
Saudi partnership and the wider regional
security environment.  The critical question
for policy makers and the international
community must be to identify the instru-
ments of national power that can usefully
influence the House of Saud’s decision-
making calculus to prevent a decision to
proliferate. In considering how to approach
the issue, it is important that the United
States openly concede the gaps in its
knowledge about the motivations and
intentions of the members of the senior
leadership (and other important domestic
actors) who will play a role in shaping
Saudi Arabia’s approach to protecting the
kingdom.  The difficulties of penetrating
what is largely an opaque decision-making
environment cannot be underestimated as
the United States thinks about fashioning
an effective counterproliferation policy.
A few guidelines suggest themselves:
• Both the internal and external security
environments of the kingdom must be
adjusted to reduce its sense of insecurity.
• Coercive diplomacy and rhetoric directed
at Saudi Arabia is likely to backfire,
providing further ammunition to internal
actors calling for a reduced U.S.-Saudi
security partnership.  Instead, the United
States should quietly assist the regime’s
internal battle against al-Qaeda.  This
can help provide the House of Saud with
the space to manage the process of
internal political evolution while simulta-
neously battling the militants.
• Forestalling Iranian acquisition of fissile
material that could be used for nuclear
weapons is obviously a central challenge
that will affect the security of all re-
gional states, including Saudi Arabia.
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